

F O R U M

October 2002

Arizona State
University
College of Law
FORUM is
published for
alumni, students,
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America's Continuing Response to 9/11: The Rule of Law and the Role of Lawyers¹

When lightning strikes, hidden shadows are thrown into brilliant and bold relief. What previously had been ignored or taken for granted is now seen anew. Such, perhaps, has been the impact on American life of the terrible tragedy of September 11, 2001.

As we pause to remember the innocent thousands who lost their lives in the horrific, coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and the aborted attack on the U.S. Capitol which ended in broken wreckage in an open field near Shanksville (Somerset), Pennsylvania, we mourn their loss not just because they were innocent, but because their death was the result of a deliberate act of terror visited upon them, as it could have been on any one of us, for the sole reason that they were living and working in the United States. And so we mourn their loss as human beings, one for another. This should not, however, be all that we do, as lawyers and lawyers-to-be.

On this, the first anniversary of the terrible attacks on September 11, 2001, we should ask ourselves how the law has helped our nation define its response to these terrible acts of war, and the role that lawyers are called upon to play in American society in times of crisis and great stress such as this. By doing so, we not only mourn the losses of September 11, we also celebrate the lives that those losses represent, and the singular nature of the American society in which those lives were lived, and as to which our attackers stand in bitter contrast.

This is not the first time that the ASU College of Law has met to mark these tragic events. Some of you may recall that from October 2001 to May 2002, the College of Law held a series of luncheon seminars to mark the impact of 9/11, under the overall title of, "Challenges." Professor Fernando Teson noted that the attacks challenged America to respond in ways that were consistent with international law; Professor Jeffrie Murphy reminded us that any response must not succumb to mere revenge; Professor Larry Winer discussed why the government should not restrain the media in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Professors Paul Bender and Catherine O'Grady discussed the implications of the War Powers Act, our war in Afghanistan and racial profiling in the U.S.; and Adjunct Professor Roxanna Bacon considered the effects of our response on U.S. immigration law and policy. Professor Betsy Grey explained how tort liability and insurance law would be affected by the federal government's efforts to provide compensation to the victims of the

World Trade Center, and Professor Gary Marchant showed how the still unsolved anthrax attacks which followed the bombings of September 11 might affect future legal restrictions and public health responses to bio-terrorism events.

These presentations reminded us of something we too often take for granted or just ignore; the dominant role of law and the legal process in American society. For example, while our nation armed for war, Congress also passed the USA Patriots Act² to provide more powerful and flexible tools for the government to use in its response to these attacks.

Today, however, when we mourn and remember those whose deaths on 9/11 prompted our government's new response to terrorism, I want to focus on the milieu in which this response is taking place, as a fitting testament to the lives that were lost. In the United States the legal process is not intended to impose a consensus of opinion or a unanimity of views. Far from it. The law is both an instrument of authority – through which public policy decisions are made and by which those decisions are upheld and made legitimate – and at the same time, the most powerful tool we have to protect the rights of citizens and residents against abuses of that authority. Thus, for example, today some in Congress are considering whether to amend the USA Patriots Act to correct what they perceive as abuses of the power the Act

conferred on investigative and law enforcement agencies to share information.

It is this willingness to measure our response against the values of our fundamental democratic principles that makes our society different from those who have attacked us. We would not be true to ourselves or to the memory of those who perished on 9/11 if we did not acknowledge and celebrate what the legal process helps us to do. It enables us to define our differences with clarity even while it bars us from allowing our differences to define our relationship to the state. It helps us resolve the disputes that are an inevitable consequence of such differences. And it serves as a basis to legitimize the decisions that are made in the name of our civil society.

In this way, our society differs dramatically from those – whether foreign or domestic, whether named Osama Bin



Myles V. Lynk²

(continued on page 4)

¹ An address to the students, faculty and staff of the Arizona State University College of Law, Tempe, AZ, on September 11, 2002.

² Kiewit Foundation Professor of Law and the legal Profession, ASU College of Law.

³ HR 3162 (revised), 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 24, 2001); ___ Stat. ___.



SUPREME COURT JUSTICE RYAN INVESTED AT ASU COLLEGE OF LAW

Arizona Supreme Court Justice Michael Ryan was invested on September 20 in the Great Hall at the ASU College of Law. Various dignitaries offered remarks welcoming Justice Ryan to the bench of Arizona's highest court. Justice Ryan said he was "overwhelmed," but that he would "do [his] best to honor the trust shown in me and do my best to honor the good people of Arizona."

Jon Rose

ASU Law Professor Jonathan Rose Invested As A Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar

ASU College of Law Dean Patricia White invested ASU Law Professor Jonathan Rose with the permanent title of Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar at 4:00 pm on September 19th in ASU College of Law's Great Hall.

"Receiving the title of Pedrick Distinguished Scholar means a lot to me," said Professor Rose, who was hired by Dean Pedrick. "Pedrick was one of my early professional mentors and heroes. It is also nice to get public recognition for this new effort I find so interesting, and it symbolizes the incredible support Dean White has given me."

Following the Investiture, Professor Rose discussed his research into the legal issues surrounding the life and death of Sir John Fastolf, a 15th Century Knight and military leader in the last half of the Hundred Years War who used the spoils of war to amass vast landholdings in England. Professor Rose said that during his life, Fastolf took many steps to insure that his lands, and at death his estate, would be used primarily to establish a religious college at Caister in Norfolk where the monks would pray for his soul after his death.

On his deathbed, Fastolf produced an oral will that repudiated his prior written will and left all his lands and control of his estate to his lawyer. As a result, a dispute erupted between contesting executors that lasted for a dozen years over the validity of the oral will. Another executor, a leading religious figure, finally arranged a compromise between the two sides, and ultimately that executor gained control of Fastolf's lands. The religious college was never built at Caister but rather that executor used Fastolf's lands to found Magdalen College at Oxford University where to this day prayers are said for the soul of the executor and Sir John Fastolf.

Professor Rose took sabbatical leave last year to examine the 15th Century Fastolf papers and other documents in the archives of Magdalen College, the Bodleian Library at Oxford University and the Public Records Office at Kew, near London. Professor Rose investigated the legal issues raised in litigation to which Fastolf was a party during his lifetime and in the will contest that followed his death. Professor Rose focused particularly on the professional norms of the judges and lawyers of the time and 15th Century land-law and the law governing inheritance. In order to do the research, Professor

Rose had to learn Medieval Latin and law French, the professional languages of the day.

He also drew on his paleographic talents to decipher the crimped shorthand and abbreviations used in medieval legal records and other documents.

Professor Rose's recent publications include *Doctrinal Development: Legal History, Law, and Legal Theory*, 22 Oxford J. Legal Studies 323 (2002);

Unauthorized Practice of Law in Arizona: A Legal and Political Problem That Won't Go Away, 34 Ariz. St. L. J. 585 (2002); *Learning to be a Legal Historian: Reflections of a Non-Traditional Student*, 51 J. Legal Educ. 294 (2001); *Of Ambidexters and Daffidowndillies: Defamation of Lawyers, Legal Ethics and Professional Reputation*, 8 U. Chi. Law School Roundtable 423 (2001); *The Ambidextrous Lawyer: Conflict of Interest and the Medieval Legal Profession*, 7 U. Chi. Law School Roundtable 136 (2000); *Medieval Attitudes Toward the Legal Profession: The Past as Prologue*, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 345 (1999); *The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation*, 48 Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (1998); *State Antitrust Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics*, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 71 (1994); *The MacCrate Report: A Restatement of Legal Education – The Need for Reflection and Horse Sense*, 44 J. Legal Educ. 545 (1994).

The Pedrick Scholar title honors ASU College of Law's first Dean, Willard H. Pedrick, who saw ASU College of Law from its inception to national prominence. When he retired in 1983, friends and colleagues set up endowments to support faculty research in honor of his service and achievements. "All those professors are actively involved in ongoing research, and this is a fitting tribute to both them and Dean Pedrick," said Dean White.

Professor Rose graduated with from the University of Minnesota Law School *magna cum laude* in 1963. In addition to authoring many articles, reports and book reviews, Professor Rose has received numerous awards, including four for excellence in teaching. He was appointed Special Assistant to Governor Bruce Babbitt and sat on both the Governor's Regulatory Review Council and the Arizona Board of Legal Specialization. He is a member of the Selden Society, The American Society of Legal History, and the American Law Institute.

In conjunction with his Investiture as a Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, Professor Jonathan Rose co-moderated with Associate Dean and Professor Patrick Brennan, the Second ASU College of Law Conference on Current Issues in Legal History. Those presenting papers included John H. Baker, Downing Professor of the Laws of England at St. Catharine's College at Cambridge University, Dr. Paul Brand, Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College at Oxford University, Daniel R. Coquillette, the J. Donald Monan, SJ, University Professor at Boston College Law School and Laurent Mayali, Lloyd D. Robbins Professor at the University of California, in Berkeley. The commentators included ASU Professor and Dean of Academic Affairs Patrick Brennan, Professor David Seipp, Boston University Law School, Professor Joseph Biancalana, University of Cincinnati Law School, Professor Richard Helmholz, Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, ASU History Professor Thomas J. Davis, Professor Barbara Aronstein Black, George Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History, Columbia University Law School, Ahmanson-Murphy Distinguished Professor Emeritus James Brundage, University of Kansas, and Prof. Frank Herrmann, S.J., Boston College Law School.

Professor Rose said at the conclusion of the conference, "The University is honored to have such a distinguished panel of legal historians attend the conference. We are particularly proud to have Professor Baker, the acknowledged dean in the field, and Dr. Paul Brand, an old friend who has previously visited the College.





Law, Power, and Love

A Talk to Incoming Law Students

(NB: The following is the opening section of a speech delivered by Professor Brennan to the incoming class of 2005 on Monday, August 19, 2002. Because of the importance of the ideas conveyed in the speech and its length, it will be serialized in this and the next two issues of the Forum.)

I am not certain what each of you has come here to law school to do, but I do entertain some educated guesses and these lead me to suggest a complementary or perhaps even alternative aspiration. It is this: Take these three years to learn how to do law well; even more, learn that the point of doing law well is to do good; still more, learn that doing good through law is about using power to achieve love's ends. "The central problem of the legal enterprise," as Judge John Noonan suggests, "...is the relation of love to power." Rather than of love, we could talk today about this or that, just as we can use the power called law for this or that, for good or for evil, for life or for death. Let us, rather, talk and think about what place law has in love and love has in law. And let us begin with law and what doing it well can be said to be, turn from there to what place the good has in law, and from these considerations finally to love's labor for the good in law.

So, we begin with law. The characteristic if not quite exclusive method by which the typical American law school – and in this respect this law school is no exception – invites

its students to begin (as we say) 'thinking like a lawyer' is the reading the opinions of appellate courts. You will read dozens, perhaps hundreds, of appellate decisions during your first year, and one of the questions you will be asked to put to each is, What is the law? What is the law of this case? In other words – though the point is rarely made as pointedly as I am about to make it – you will be looking to materials, putatively legal materials, in order to *find the law*. The point is, as you face what has been written down, unless you are just going to gape at the black marks on the page, you will need to engage in a process to settle what the little black scribbles on the printed page offer or, rather, can offer, *in the name of law*. The further question you will be asked to put, in aid of this inquiry, is this: Does the court claim to base its decision, its holding, in discernible legal materials, or was this, in the court's eyes, a case of "first impression" as to which there existed no dispositive legal materials, no law.

There is much about the latter disjunctive question that is wrongheaded, but I want to leave that aside for the moment and ask you to notice this: the

monocular of law gives way immediately, if unconsciously, to the binocular that is "law and _____." Law is not always already available and everywhere you might like it to be. Sometimes, even in the judicial opinions of self-styled conservative jurists, law must be, and therefore is, made. The result is that you will soon find yourself admitting under professorial cross-examination that the court based its decision not on law (because there was none "on point") but instead on something else. That something is called "policy grounds." The habit of mind of a large segment of the modern legal academy is, I regret to report, to treat the apex of your education into law as the discovery that what at first looks like "just law" is instead, lo and behold, "law and policy." It is against this declension of intelligence that I would like to inoculate you. I doubt I shall succeed, but there is too much at stake to allow that eventuality to dissuade me.

This, indeed, is the cardinal point: to get clear on what is at stake in the enterprise we call law. This proves to be difficult because we live late in the day, we live, even after September 11th, in the salad days; things might not be as good as they

used to be (they never were), but we can and do take for granted the obtaining of generally orderly conditions and a certain modicum or at least semblance of justice, and for these we (justly) credit law. The revolution is far enough in the past and the Constitutional legal order to which it gave birth firmly enough in place, that what Constitutionally constituted legislatures and courts proffer in the name of the law is so plentiful that we are forgetful that law's abounding is no guarantee of anything particularly good's even entering let alone abounding. Nor, let us be clear, are statutes and cases and regulations-highly-reticulated, and based on even the cleverest "policy," any guarantee that law is making any contribution to, indeed that law is not thwarting, our leading good lives. Law almost by definition succeeds in ordering our living, but order is not all there is and may not be for the good. There is, I feel sure, plentiful order in Hell. As the late Yale law Professor Grant Gilmore put the point: "In Hell there will be nothing but law and due process will be meticulously observed."

America's Continuing Response to 9/11 (continued from page 1)

Ladin or Timothy McVeigh – who would impose, through violence, their social or political views on the United States; who would use their fundamentalist beliefs as instruments to coerce consensus. To those who have attacked us, truth is both divinely ordained and self-evidently revealed, even if only to them. By contrast, in a pluralistic, secular, civil society such as ours, we recognize that in man-made institutions, the truth is not self-evident. We recognize at least two sides to each dispute, and acknowledge that we can only approach the truth, through a discourse which enables us to test different perceptions and a variety of experiences. The legal process permits this discourse within agreed-upon rules and principles. Our society remains stable and ordered, not because we all share the same views or have identical opinions, but precisely because we do not. We are able to resolve our disputes through a legal process and institutions of law that permit us to express the most diametrically opposed views, in forums either judicial, legislative or executive, whose decisions are legitimate because they are reached through this legal process.

This debate sustains us, it does not destroy us, because we do share the values of our fundamental principles. “And among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”

Let us review for a moment the roots of that process that are allowed to flourish here. In the Declaration of Independence the Founders spoke of the liberty we each have in life to pursue our different visions of happiness. After the Revolutionary War, the first national government, under the Articles of Confederation, protected the prerogatives of the individual states at the cost of national unity and an effective central government. This cost proved too expensive to bear, and so, in 1789, the Constitution was adopted to forge a truer national consensus. It was soon amended by the Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties from possible abuses of power by a powerful central government. Left unresolved by the Constitution or the Bill of Rights was the national debate over slavery. That debate, so fundamental to our national character, was not finally resolved until the Civil War was fought and won, slavery abolished, and our sense of national purpose redefined in the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution.

The Constitution is our seminal legal text. We are all aware of its system of “checks and balances,” by which no one branch of the federal government can overwhelm the others. The system of checks and balances is a testament to a theory of law and governance that is both skeptical and practical, and can therefore accommodate a diversity of views.

Our First Amendment freedom of religion guarantees a multiplicity of creeds, with no one religion having any official or governmental support. Today, approximately 113 different religious denominations are recognized at Arlington National Cemetery.

The United States is famously diverse in the race and ethnicity of its citizens. There is no direct equivalence between race and citizenship in this country, as there is in others. Among the most dramatic aspects of 19th and 20th century American history has been the great migration of persons from different cultural, religious, racial and ethnic groups to the United States. The thousands who died in New York at the World Trade Center mirrored this diversity of American society.

Finally, with respect to regional differences, lawyers and law students should be first to remember how important this was in American life, and still is today. The fear of regional bias against out of state litigants lead to the adoption of diversity juris-

diction in the federal courts to ensure that out-of-state plaintiffs could bring cases in United States district courts, and out-of-state defendants could remove cases to such courts, to avoid local bias in state courts, even if no other federal question is presented in the case other than the diverse state residency of the litigants.⁴

In fact, our Constitution, and the American legal system in general, do not require consensus of opinion beyond the shared values of our underlying principles of tolerance, equality, due process and freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion in individual lives. The Constitution and our other laws are “interpreted.” Their truths are not self-evident. Rather, they are instruments of legitimization and dispute resolution. In the United States, we take it for granted that people in the pursuit of their own interests will disagree, sometimes strongly, with others who are pursuing their own interests. It is the role of lawyers to interpret the law, to resolve these disputes through the application of accepted rules of legal interpretation.

Thus, a recent headline in *The Arizona Republic* noted, “Bush has power to hit Iraq, lawyers say.”⁵ It is a peculiarly American phenomenon that a lawyer’s opinion would help legitimate a decision whether or not to go to war. And, in a different vein, a recent headline read, “Anti-terror tracking raises fears of racial profiling.”⁶ It is a credit to this country that in the midst of war, we take time to reflect on the loss of civil liberties of those whom we think are terrorists or have aided and abetted terrorists. This is evidence enough, if further evidence were needed, that there is no moral equivalency between those who attacked the United States on 9/11 intending to kill innocent civilians, and the United States’ response in Afghanistan and around the world.

Within the United States, after 9/11, the federal government exercised its authority through various statutory and regulatory regimes. Congress and the Administration are debating what powers and authority should be included in the new Department of Homeland Security, and how the immigration laws and the Immigration and Naturalization Service should be changed in the wake of 9/11 to reflect new policies, and new laws less complacent about the safety of our borders. Debate continues throughout the legal community over the extent to which the civil liberties of suspected terrorists or their accomplices have been violated, or should be enforced, by the Department of Justice. The secret federal court established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act recently rejected procedures proposed by the Department of Justice to give prosecutors routine access to information obtained through intelligence gathering techniques, and the Department has decided to appeal that decision.

This is as it should be. The attacks of 9/11 did not succeed in silencing the discordant voices of American life, or the legal system that protects and enhances that life. We as lawyers have a necessary role to play in that legal system. We will not always be on the same side of every legal issue; in fact, we may never be on the same side. And this is exactly what our system of justice is all about. Differences are debated vigorously. The law is the instrument to resolve those differences, but not to silence that debate. A necessary part of our response as a civil society to those who attacked us on 9/11 is to continue this debate. To not be silent or afraid.

As we mourn and remember those who died on 9/11 let us not forget the important features of the society that they – by their innocent sacrifice – have come to embody and to represent.

“Debate continues throughout the legal community over the extent to which the civil liberties of suspected terrorists or their accomplices have been violated, or should be enforced, by the Department of Justice.”

“The attacks of 9/11 did not succeed in silencing the discordant voices of American life, or the legal system that protects and enhances that life. We as lawyers have a necessary role to play in that legal system.”

⁴ Today, diversity jurisdiction is available in the federal courts where the amount in controversy between the parties exceeds the sum or value of \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

⁵ *The Arizona Republic*, p. A1 (Monday, Aug. 26, 2002).

⁶ *The Arizona Republic*, p. A1 (Thursday, Sept. 5, 2002).

Writing and Riding with David Kaye

It's a certainty, not a mere probability – Regent's Professor of Law David Kaye's world is one of equilibrium. His research, applying probability theory to the law, deals routinely with matters of evidence where death and life hang in the balance. In addition to earning a JD from Yale University, his consideration of the zero-sum universe earned him a Master's degree in Astronomy from Harvard. He's also proficient in Aikido, the martial art that turns an opponent's own force against him. You may even have seen Professor Kaye zooming to campus on a Razor scooter, maintaining poise as he alternated between pushing and coasting.

Professor Kaye returned recently from the Fifth International Conference on Forensic Statistics in Venice, where, in addition to serving on the program committee, he delivered a presentation contrasting DNA and fingerprint evidence. The conference was an interdisciplinary gathering rife with talk of probability theory's practical applications. And what, exactly, is probability theory? "Simply put, it's a mathematical analysis that allows us to determine how probable events are to happen or to have happened," says Professor Kaye.

Though his initial interests lay in the area of constitutional law, classroom experience led him down a more technical path. "I was teaching a class, Law & Technology in Society, and a student mentioned a California case dealing with evidence that purported to establish the probability of paternity. There were serious problems with the admitted testimony. Professor Ira Ellman and I wrote an article analyzing the issue. At about the same time, another law review article came out dealing with a related subject, and it too contained errors. So I wrote a response to that article...these things have a way of building on themselves and gaining momentum."

Now he's the go-to expert in the field. "I translate science writing so that lawyers can understand it," he says modestly. But his vita tells the tale: with seven books, fifty-one articles in print and countless other presentations, chapters, comments and monographs to his credit, Professor Kaye has built a tremendous body of scholarship. His prolific writing hasn't prevented him from engaging the classroom. "You can't separate one from the other," he says. "Many times, good ideas come from students."

Instead of spending all his time dwelling on the legal implications of base pairs or Symmetric Markov Chains, Professor Kaye retires to the Arizona wilderness for exercise when he can. "I'm an avid hiker and skier,"


he says. "I enjoy ski mountaineering, and I wanted to stay in shape last winter. I used to jog, but I'd be too sweaty by the time I got to the school. So I went with the scooter," he shrugs, as if it's unremarkable to see an imminent scholar zip by on what appears, at first glance, to be a skateboard with handlebars.

When speaking of his fitness regimen Professor Kaye naturally turns to Aikido, which he began studying fourteen years ago. He started by joining a group of other professors, students, and staff at lunchtime to practice the Japanese martial art, popularized stateside by 90's action film star Steven Segal. "It has roots in ju-jitsu, karate, and other martial arts," Professor Kaye says, describing the elegance of the form. "The object is to immobilize or throw an attacker. There are a lot of circular motions. It's not passive, but it emphasizes soft contact and blending over hard strikes and opposition." The original group of students was successful in its studies; Professor Kaye is now a third-degree black belt and practices with his former training-mates at a dojo (a place specifically set aside for training, study and reflection) in downtown Tempe.

The likelihood of Professor Kaye using his expertise on an attacker is fairly low, and yet his years of training have already saved him from harm on one occasion. "Most fights start at bars, and I don't go out to those sorts of places very often. But once, I was riding a mountain bike in Scotland, and I was thrown from the bike. I did a roll – an Aikido roll, without thinking – and that allowed me to recover gracefully without hurting myself."

Professor Kaye has been married to Nancy Patrick since 1972. The couple has two children, both attending ASU. Son Alexander is an undergraduate, and daughter Miranda is a graduate student studying sports psychology. "She's the real athlete," he says.

David Kaye



FORUM SCHOLARS NAMED

Kiersten Murphy and Kevin Wein received the 2002 Forum Scholarships, which are awarded for academic achievement.



KIERSTEN MURPHY

"It is an honor and a wonderful surprise to receive the Forum Scholarship," said Murphy. "The law school experience has been both challenging and enriching, and I appreciate so very much the Dean's graciousness in granting me this scholarship."



KEVIN WEIN

"The Forum Scholarship has enabled me to focus on enjoying my last year of school. I sincerely appreciate the generosity of the Dean and the College of Law in awarding me this scholarship," said Wein.

Calendar of Events

Visit our website at www.law.asu.edu for event updates, information about the College of Law, or to view previous issues of the FORUM.

October 23, 2002

ASU College of Law, the ASU College of Law's Indian Legal Program and the Native American Law Students' Association will host a gaming debate at 6:00 p.m. in the Great Hall. Parties representing proponents of Propositions 200, 201 and 202 will inform the public of their positions, take questions, and engage one another in debate on the ballot issues. For more information, please contact Kate Rosier at 480-965-6204, kathlene.rosier@asu.edu

October 25, 2002

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit will hear *Hills v. Scottsdale Unified School District #48* and *United States v. Al Salmi* (case summaries) at 9:30 a.m. in the Great Hall, ASU College of Law. The court session is open to the general public. Panel to be announced. A question and answer session will follow the arguments. For more information, please contact 480-965-3096.

November 7, 2002

A tribute to Jack Brown and the creation of an endowed chair in his honor will begin at 4:00 p.m. in the Great Hall, ASU College of Law. Principal speaker Justice Ruth V. McGregor will address "Recent Developments in Arizona State Constitutional Law." Panelists will be Professor Paul Bender, ASU College of Law and attorney Paul Eckstein, Brown & Bain, P.A. For more information or to RSVP, please contact Alexandra Parker at 480-965-5290, alexandra.parker@asu.edu

November 14-16, 2002

ASU College of Law's Clinical Programs will host the National Institute of Trial Advocacy's Taking & Defending Depositions Seminar, November 14-16. Participants in this seminar may qualify for up to 18 hours of CLE credit, including 2 hours toward the Professional Responsibility Requirement. For more information or to register, please contact Nita Admissions at 800-225-6482. www.nita.org

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